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Recent research with moral dilemmas supports dual-process model of moral decision
making. This model posits two different paths via which people can endorse utilitarian
solution that requires personally harming someone in order to achieve the greater good
(e.g., killing one to save five people): (i) weakened emotional aversion to the prospect of
harming someone due to reduced empathic concern for the victim; (ii) enhanced cognition
which supports cost-benefit analysis and countervails the prepotent emotional aversion
to harm. Direct prediction of this model would be that personality traits associated with
reduced empathy would show higher propensity to endorse utilitarian solutions. As per
this prediction, we found that trait alexithymia, which is well-known to have deficits
in empathy, was indeed associated with increased utilitarian tendencies on emotionally
aversive personal moral dilemmas and this was due to reduced empathic concern for the
victim. Results underscore the importance of empathy for moral judgments in harm/care
domain of morality.
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“Interesting, yes, emotions. The grit on the lens, the fly in the
ointment.”
– Sherlock Holmes (Sherlock)
INTRODUCTION
MORAL DILEMMAS AND DUAL-PROCESS MODEL
The aversion to harming others is an integral part of the foun-
dations of human moral sense and it presents itself in the form
of deeply ingrained moral intuitions (Haidt and Joseph, 2004).
Since creating laboratory situations to investigate harm aversion
raises ethical issues, research has primarily relied on studying
hypothetical cases like moral dilemmas where participants need
to give judgments about whether they would be willing to harm
one person so that many others would go unhurt. Moral dilem-
mas are ideal for the purpose of studying harm aversion because
the type of harm and the means of carrying out this harm can
be systematically varied in these situations to see how varia-
tions in these factors affects moral judgments (Christensen and
Gomila, 2012; Trémolière and De Neys, 2013). For example, the
trolley dilemma (Thomson, 1985) asks participants to judge if it
is appropriate for them to switch a trolley hurtling down on a
track toward five people onto an alternate track where there is
just one person, while the footbridge dilemma (Thomson, 1985)
asks participants to judge if it is appropriate for them to push
a large person standing near them off of a footbridge, so that
this individual would fall down to his/her death and collide with
the trolley, stopping it from running over five people down the
track. People who endorse switching the trolley or pushing the
person are said to have taken utilitarian decision because utili-
tarianism (Mill, 1863/1998) argues that it is morally acceptable
to cause harm to few if this is going to prevent a greater num-
ber of people from getting hurt. On the other hand, people who
refuse to accept switching the trolley or pushing the person are
said to have taken deontological decision because deontology
(Kant, 1785/2005) argues that individuals have inviolable right
and duties which can’t be infringed upon even if doing so would
maximize welfare of more number of individuals. These two
dilemmas respectively are quintessential examples of two classes
of moral dilemmas: impersonal and personal moral dilemmas
(Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2009). They differ in their structural
descriptions and mental representations (Mikhail, 2007). In per-
sonal moral dilemmas, the victim needs to be harmed using
personal force (i.e., by executing a motor act) and this harm is
intentional rather than a side-effect (Cushman et al., 2006; Greene
et al., 2009). Thus, footbridge dilemma is an example of a per-
sonal moral dilemma where the victim is pushed via muscular
force and its death is needed for the utilitarian outcome to mate-
rialize and is, thus, not a side-effect. On the other hand, trolley
dilemma is an example of an impersonal moral dilemma where
the harm is caused in an impersonal way by pushing the switch
and death of the victim is a side-effect of switching the trolley on
the alternate track and not a means by which the lives of five are
being saved. Although the net outcome of choosing to act in both
types of dilemmas is the same (four net lives saved), most people
endorse utilitarian solutions on impersonal dilemmas but refuse
to do so on personal dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2008,
2009; Cushman et al., 2006; Hauser et al., 2007; Mikhail, 2007;
Moore et al., 2008; Gleichgerrcht and Young, 2013).
The most influential model to account for these findings has
been proposed by Joshua Greene and colleagues (Greene et al.,
2001, 2004, 2008, 2009; Greene, 2007, in press; Shenhav and
Greene, 2014), called dual-process model, which posits two set
of computational processes that support these two competing
moral ideologies: (1) deliberative reasoning processes that engage
in cost-benefit analysis by a conscious weighing of different social
norms and situational factors and support utilitarian solution;
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(2) automatic, affect-laden intuitions that surface as a reflex to
aversive nature of the proposed harm and subserve deontologi-
cal intuitions. Thus, according to Greene’s model, when people
think about moral dilemmas and face the question as to whether
one person should be sacrificed so that many more would be
better off, they experience an aversive, negative emotional reac-
tion to the prospect of actively harming someone physically. This
aversion can partially stem from the bad outcome due empathic
concern for the victim’s pain which causes personal distress in
the observer/actor (Pizarro, 2000; Miller and Cushman, 2013)
and partially from performing the bad action itself due to his-
tory of aversive conditioning associated with the sensorimotor
and perceptual properties of the action (Cushman et al., 2012;
Miller et al., 2014). If this prepotent, negative affect stemming
from harm aversion is strong enough and is not countervailed
by deliberative reasoning processes, deontological inclinations
would prevail and people would judge it wrong to sacrifice one
person to save five, as in personal moral dilemma. On the other
hand, if there is not a strong emotional reaction to the prospect of
harming someone, then the controlled cognition would dominate
the decision making process and would lead to endorsement of
utilitarian solution, as in impersonal moral dilemma. It is impor-
tant to note that the two processes proposed by dual-process
model are independent processes that contribute to the final out-
come and are not inversely proportional to each other (Conway
and Gawronski, 2013). Thus, one can find it morally accept-
able to personally harm someone in order to achieve the greater
good either because they are better at cognitive deliberation (e.g.,
abstract reasoning, problem solving, etc.) and find it pragmati-
cally more acceptable after cost-benefit analysis or because they
have a blunted sense of harm aversion due to reduced empathic
concern for the victim. There is plenty of evidence to corroborate
the claim that people take both of these routes when they make
utilitarian decisions on moral dilemmas.
TWO PATHS TO UTILITARIAN MORAL JUDGMENTS
People who report to have higher need for cognition, i.e., peo-
ple who say they enjoy engaging in deliberate reasoning, tend
to be more utilitarian (Bartels, 2008). Also, people with higher
workingmemory capacity, which provides the necessary cognitive
resources for cognitive deliberation, prefer utilitarian solutions
for moral dilemmas (Moore et al., 2008). People who perform
better on cognitive reflection task, which assesses individual’s
propensity to distrust intuitions in favor of reflective and delib-
erative processes, also prefer utilitarian solutions (Paxton et al.,
2012, 2013; Baron, 2013; but see Royzman et al., in press).
Disrupting cognitive processing by imposing cognitive load or by
using noninvasive brain stimulation techniquemakes participants
either slow down while endorsing utilitarian solutions (Greene
et al., 2008) or makes it less likely that they will endorse utili-
tarian solutions (Trémolière et al., 2012; Conway and Gawronski,
2013; Jeurissen et al., 2014; but see Tassy et al., 2012). Easing up
cognitive demands by using efficient kill-save ratios makes people
more utilitarian (Trémolière and Bonnefon, 2014). Cognitively
exhausting participants using sleep deprivation also increases
response latencies while providing utilitarian moral judgments
(Killgore et al., 2007; Tempesta et al., 2011). Forcing participants
to respond as quickly as possible without giving sufficient time
for deliberative reflection to weigh in makes participants more
deontologically inclined (Suter and Hertwig, 2011; Cummins and
Cummins, 2012). Stress is well-known to inhibit cognitive con-
trol and affect working memory capacity, which are the very
cognitive resources needed to make utilitarian moral judgments.
Accordingly, stressed participants are less likely to endorse utili-
tarian solutions than unstressed participants (Starcke et al., 2012;
Youssef et al., 2012). Thus, existing studies support the pres-
ence of reflective reasoning path that leads to utilitarian moral
judgments.
On the other hand, there is also evidence corroborating the
claim that blunted negative affect due to reduced empathy for
the victim in the dilemma can lead to the utilitarian solution.
Meta-analysis of brain imaging studies shows that moral cog-
nition recruits subset of the brain areas involved in empathy
(Bzdok et al., 2012; Sevinc and Spreng, 2014) and damage to
these areas results in aberrant empathic skills and moral judg-
ments. Patients with damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC, a brain region essential for proper emotional process-
ing), frontal traumatic brain injury patients, and patients suffer-
ing from behavioral variant of frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD,
which also includes deterioration of frontal lobes) are known to
possess uncallous emotionality, shallow social affect, and tend to
lack empathy. All of these populations are more likely to endorse
utilitarian solutions on high-conflict, personal moral dilemmas
(Mendez et al., 2005; Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007;
Mendez and Shapira, 2009; Moretto et al., 2010; Gleichgerrcht
et al., 2011; Thomas et al., 2011; Martins et al., 2012; Chiong
et al., 2013; Taber-Thomas et al., 2014) than brain-damaged
and neurotypical control populations. This is probably because
they find the prospect of personally harming someone less emo-
tionally aversive due to reduced empathic response, as shown
by reduced skin conductance arousal in vmPFC patients when
they face personal moral dilemmas (Moretto et al., 2010) and
reduced emotional empathy on self-report measures in bvFTD
patients (Gleichgerrcht et al., 2011). Core aspects of psychopathy
are also associated with lack of empathy and shallow affect and
both incarcerated, clinical psychopaths (Koenigs et al., 2012) and
nonincarcerated individuals with psychopathic tendencies show
predilection for utilitarian solutions on personal moral dilem-
mas (Glenn et al., 2010; Bartels and Pizarro, 2011; Langdon
and Delmas, 2012; Gao and Tang, 2013; Seara-Cardoso et al.,
2013; Tassy et al., 2013; Djeriouat and Trémolière, 2014). One
behavioral study shows that justifications given by psychopathic
personalities for utilitarian moral judgments involve less inclu-
sion of empathic terms (McIlwain et al., 2012), while brain
imaging studies show that these increased utilitarian dispositions
in psychopathy are due to reduced activity in subgenual ante-
rior cingulated cortex (Wiech et al., 2013), which is implicated
in empathic concern for others. People who score high on trait
emotional empathy also show reduced tendency to endorse per-
sonal harms and resort to deontological responses (Choe and
Min, 2011), while self-reported or peer-reported low scores on
dispositional empathic concern (whichmeasures individual’s ten-
dency to experience feelings of warmth, compassion, and concern
for other people), predict higher proportion of utilitarian moral
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judgments (McIlwain et al., 2012; Côte et al., 2013; Gleichgerrcht
and Young, 2013; Jack et al., 2014; Miller et al., 2014) and higher
unpleasantness ratings for both impersonal and personal moral
dilemmas (Sarlo et al., 2014). Also, enhancing the empathic con-
cern for the would-be victims by showing their photographs
(Conway and Gawronski, 2013), highlighting their humanness
(Majdandžic´ et al., 2012), emphasizing their competency (Cikara
et al., 2010), or drawing attention to age of the sacrificial target
(Kawai et al., 2014) makes people less inclined toward utilitarian
decisions. Making people emotionally more averse to perceived
harmful acts by pharmacologically enhancing serotonin levels in
the brain lessens frequency of decisions that endorse utilitarian
ends and, more interestingly, this effect is especially stronger for
people scoring higher on empathy (Crockett et al., 2010; also
see Terbeck et al., 2013). On the other hand, higher level of
testosterone (either baseline level or after external administra-
tion) has been associated with impairments in empathic behavior
and reduced negative social emotions and is associated with util-
itarian moral judgments for personal moral dilemmas (Carney
and Mason, 2010; Montoya et al., 2013). This is probably because
high-testosterone individuals are less sensitive to the emotion-
ally salient nature of physical harm (Carney and Mason, 2010).
Given this overwhelming evidence for the role of reduced empa-
thy in making utilitarian moral judgments, it is of value to study
populations which have known empathy deficits to see if they
show increased predisposition toward utilitarianism. One such
population is alexithymia to which we turn next.
ALEXITHYMIA AND EMPATHY DEFICITS
Alexithymia, or “no words for feeling,” is a dimensional per-
sonality construct that is characterized by reduced capacity to
experience emotions, absence of tendency to reflect on one’s own
emotions, difficulty in identifying feelings and bodily sensations
associated with emotional arousal, and describing these feelings
to others (Nemiah et al., 1976), e.g., individuals with alexithymia
might be aware that they are experiencing an emotion, but would
be unable to pinpoint if the emotion is anger, sadness, or dis-
gust. Given the critical role of emotion in effective social behavior
like perception and evaluation of socio-emotional stimuli and
regulation and modulation of social behavior according to such
evaluations, alexithymic population performs poorly on a num-
ber of social cognition tasks, e.g., empathy, emotion recognition,
emotional interoception, etc. (Wingbermühle et al., 2012; Bird
and Cook, 2013). Of interest to the current study are problems
associated with empathy in alexithymic personalities.
Empathy is composed of two separate and equally important
components: (i) cognitive empathy involves understanding oth-
ers’ emotional states by forming abstract mental representations
of these states while maintaining self-other distinction; (ii) affec-
tive empathy involves experiencing these emotional states (de
Vignemont and Singer, 2006). In other words, affective empa-
thy entails that we share the isomorphic affective state of the
target (“I suffer, because you suffer”), while cognitive empa-
thy involves merely representing these affective states without
necessarily experiencing them (“From my observation of your
behavior, I infer that you are suffering”). Recent work in social
neuroscience supports the shared network model of empathy
which posits that the same brain regions that are involved in map-
ping body’s physiological states that inform of us of our subjective
feelings states are also involved when we try to predict the feel-
ing states of others (Decety and Sommerville, 2003; Singer and
Lamm, 2009; for meta-analytic evidence, see Lamm et al., 2011).
In other words, when people try to understand emotional states
of others and experience these states vicariously, they are guided
by their own internally generated affective states (Hooker et al.,
2008). But this very ability to identify and describe feelings and
interocepting on one’s emotions is compromised in alexithymia
(e.g., Silani et al., 2008). Because awareness of emotional states
in the self is a prerequisite to recognizing such states in oth-
ers, reduced capacity in alexithymia to recognize and attend to
one’s own affective state is expected to lead to impairment in
empathizing with others.
Indeed, high level of alexithymia is associated with reduced
activity in the empathy circuits when they empathize with oth-
ers who are experiencing pain (Moriguchi et al., 2007; Bird
et al., 2010). They also report to feel less distress at others’
suffering and are less motivated to act altruistically to relieve
another’s distress (FeldmanHall et al., 2012). Various self-report
measures of empathy, e.g., IRI (interpersonal reactivity index:
Davis, 1980, 1983), show that alexithymic personalities report
to have less empathic concern for others and reduced tendency
for perspective-taking in both community and psychiatric/clinical
populations (for a review, see Bird and Cook, 2013; also see
Guttman and Laporte, 2002; Grynberg et al., 2010). They also
show reduced empathic response to emotional facial expressions
(Lockwood et al., 2013). Thus, there is overwhelming evidence
that trait alexithymia is characterized by poor ability to under-
stand what others feel (cognitive) and experience or share others’
emotional states (affective).
CURRENT STUDY
To summarize the discussion so far, dual-process model of
decision-making predicts that deflated negative affect due to
reduced empathic concern for the victim distress when someone
thinks about personally harming the victim can lead to utilitarian
moral judgments and alexithymia is associated with reduction in
this very aspect of empathy. In this study, we extend this work
by exploring the utilitarian tendencies associated with trait alex-
ithymia and role of empathy in this association and make three
key predictions:
(1) Higher level of trait alexithymia will predict reduced
empathic concern and increased acceptance of utilitarian
choice on personal moral dilemma.
(2) Reduced empathic concern will predict higher acceptability
of the utilitarian option for personal moral dilemma.
(3) Empathic concern scale of IRI will mediate the relation
between trait alexithymia and acceptability of utilitarian
choice on personal moral dilemma.
We would not expect to see any increased tendency in trait alex-
ithymia tomake utilitarian choices on impersonal moral dilemma
because the nature of harm in this dilemma is emotionally less
salient and does not invoke the prepotent empathic response with
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the victim as the personal moral dilemma where the agent (par-
ticipant) needs to agree to harm someone personally. Also, we
do not expect alexithymic impairment in cognitive empathy (as
assessed by perspective-taking subscale of IRI) to play role in the
alexithymia-utilitarian association because a number of previous
studies show that perspective-taking does not predict utilitar-
ian moral judgments (McIlwain et al., 2012; Côte et al., 2013;
Gleichgerrcht and Young, 2013; Jack et al., 2014; Miller et al.,
2014; Sarlo et al., 2014).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Three hundred and thirty one (215 women) Italian-speaking par-
ticipants between the ages of 18 and 60 (M = 24.06, SD = 5.50)
voluntarily logged on to fill a web survey. The survey webpage was
promoted through discussion on online forums, social network,
and word of mouth. Exclusion criteria for participation included
Italian as a secondary language, presence of a diagnosed psychi-
atric illness and/or history of psychiatric treatment, history of
significant neurological illness or brain injury.
MEASURES AND PROCEDURE
All participants gave an informed consent before starting the sur-
vey. They then progressed through a series of self-report measures
that assessed variables of interest and answered two moral dilem-
mas (one impersonal and one personal). The order in which
participants completed the various questionnaires was random-
ized across participants. But since we were not interested in
studying transfer effects between dilemmas (e.g., Wiegmann and
Waldmann, 2014), the order of moral dilemmas was fixed such
that personal moral dilemma always preceded the impersonal
moral dilemma. There was no time limit to answer any of the
questionnaires or dilemmas. All the questionnaires and dilem-
mas provided were in Italian and the translated documents are
available upon request to the corresponding author.
Moral judgment
Participants were presented with a pair of moral dilemmas, each
of which required participants to choose whether to harm one
person to save five people (see Supplementary Text S1 for exact
wording of dilemmas). Personal moral dilemma was Footbridge
dilemma which featured emotionally aversive harm (pushing
the person to his/her death). Impersonal moral dilemma was
Standard Fumes (Greene et al., 2004) and featured less emotion-
ally salient harm (hitting a switch which would divert toxic fumes
from room with five patients to room with just one patient).
Both dilemmas were framed in first-person and asked the ques-
tion “How morally appropriate is it for you to [nature of action]
in order to [outcome of action]?” Participants could register
their answer using a 7-point Likert scale (1: not at all, 7: very
much). Higher appropriateness scores denoted more utilitarian
inclination.
Alexithymia
To assess trait alexithymia, we used validated Italian version of
Toronto Alexithymia Scale-20 (TAS-20) questionnaire (Bagby
et al., 1994; Italian version: Bressi et al., 1996), which has been
argued to be the best current measure overall for assessing alex-
ithymia due to its sound reliability, validity, and broad generaliz-
ability (Timoney andHolder, 2013). The TAS-20 is a 20-item scale
that consists of three subscales: Difficulty Describing Feelings
(DDF, 5 items, e.g., “It is difficult for me to find the right words
for my feelings”), Difficulty Identifying Feelings (DIF, 7 items,
e.g., “When I am upset, I don’t know if I am sad, frightened, or
angry”), and Externally-Oriented Thinking (EOT, 8 items, e.g.,
“I prefer to analyze problems rather than just describe them”).
Items were rated using a 5-point Likert scale (1: strongly disagree,
5: strongly agree). Higher total scores indicate higher levels of
alexithymia.
Empathy
Participants completed validated Italian version of Interpersonal
Reactivity Inventory (IRI) (Davis, 1980, 1983; Italian version:
Albiero et al., 2006), a 28-item self-report questionnaire with
four 7-item subscales, assessing specific aspects of dispositional
empathy. Participants reported agreement with statements on a
5-point Likert scale (0: never true for me, 4: always true for me).
The four subscales consisted of: (1) fantasy scale (F), which mea-
sures the propensity to identify with fictional characters (e.g., “I
really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel.”);
(2) perspective taking (PT) scale, which measures the tendency
to take the psychological point of view of others (e.g., “I try
to understand my friends better by imagining how things look
from their perspective.”); (3) empathic concern (EC) scale, which
measures the other-oriented tendency to experience feelings of
warmth, compassion, and concern for other people (e.g., “When
I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective
toward them.”); (4) personal distress (PD) scale, which measures
the self-oriented tendency to feel personal unease and discomfort
in reaction to the emotions of others (e.g., “When I see someone
who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces.”). Thus, IRI
defines empathy to be a multidimensional construct consisting of
cognitive ability to take others’ perspective (PT) and understand
their subjective reality (FS) and affective ability to put oneself in
others’ emotional shoes to experience concern for their wellbeing
(EC) and be affected by their experiences (PD).
DATA ANALYSIS
Statistical analysis was conducted using SPSS 22.0 software. Given
recent criticism of dichotomous logic of null-hypothesis testing
and poor reproducibility of p-values in psychological research
(Ioannidis, 2005), we include recommended confidence intervals
for estimator values and effect sizes (Cumming, 2014) gener-
ated using resampling and bootstrapping methods (Kirby and
Gerlanc, 2013). Unless otherwise stated, all 95% bias corrected
and accelerated confidence intervals were generated using 10,000
bootstrap samples. If present, asymmetry in 95% bias corrected
and accelerated confidence intervals reflects asymmetry of the
underlying sampling distribution of point estimates. We also
include traditional p-values, all of which are exact rather than
based on asymptotic approximation and computed from two-
tailed statistical tests.
Since the dependent variables of interest (scores on IRI sub-
scales, and acceptability ratings for moral dilemmas) did not
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follow normal distribution (Shapiro-Wilk test: p < 0.01) and
were ordinal variables, all tests employed were nonparametric.
We used ordered logistic regression models when regression was
of interest to us instead of linear regression. Test of parallel lines
showed that none of the regression models violated the propor-
tional odds assumption (p > 0.05). We report unstandardized
logit coefficients (B) from which odds ratios can be computed
using exponential function as eB. We don’t report and com-
pute odds ratios from standardized logit coefficients because there
is no widely agreed upon definition of it, thereby preventing
straightforward interpretation (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2004).
Odds ratio greater than 1 or less that 1 denote that increase
in value of predictor variable is associated with increased likeli-
hood for higher or lower value of criterion variable, respectively.
Also, for inter- and intra-group comparisons, Mann-Whitney U
test and Wilcoxon Signed Rank test were used and effect size (r)
for these tests was computed as r = Z/√n, where Z is the stan-
dardized statistic and n is the sample size (Fritz et al., 2012).
Additionally, we report Hodges–Lehmann (HL) estimator val-
ues for the median difference between groups being compared.
Correlation analysis was done using Spearman rank correla-
tions and, when necessary, partial Spearman rank correlations
were computed using SPSS syntax (see: http://www-01.ibm.com/
support/docview.wss?uid=swg21474822).
For mediation analysis, we did not use Sobel’s test because:
(a) it has poor statistical power and is not recommended for
small sample sizes n < 1000, MacKinnon et al. (2002) which was
the case for our study (n = 331); (b) it evaluates samples on
the assumption that indirect effects follow normal distribution,
which is hardly true in practice. We instead used nonparamet-
ric, Preacher-Hayes bootstrapping method to estimate indirect
effects in mediation analysis because statistical power-wise it is
more robust with small sample sizes (n < 25) and it does not
assume normal distribution for indirect effects (Preacher and
Hayes, 2004, 2008a).
Because sufficient power is required to claim meaningful null
effects (i.e., TAS, subscales of IRI, and ratings on moral dilemmas
are not correlated with each other), we conducted a sensitivity
analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2007) to determine how
small of an effect we could detect in each correlation analysis
(exact two-tailed tests, see Supplementary Tables S1,2). With a
sample size of 331, a Type II error probability of α = 0.05, and a
statistical power (Type I error probability) of β = 0.80, we could
detect an effect size > 0.153 (i.e., a small effect; Cohen, 1992). We
could not perform a similar analysis for ordinal logistic regression
analysis due to unavailability of this option in G∗Power.
RESULTS
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (TABLE 1)
The subscales of TAS-20 and IRI showed good internal reliabil-
ity (αs > 0.60). In our sample, mean alexithymia score was 44.58
(95% CI [43.42, 45.71]) with a minimum-maximum spread of
20–71. It has been reported (Loas et al., 2001) that alexithymia in
normal population follows distribution with mean of 45 (SD =
8). Thus, our sample was within normative range (one-sample
z-test: Z = −0.955, p = 0.339). When alexithymia is treated as
a categorical construct (vis-à-vis dimensional personality trait),
individuals with TAS scores equal to or greater than 61 are consid-
ered to be alexithymic (n = 30), between 52 and 60 are considered
to be possibly alexithymic (n = 60), and equal to or less than
51 are considered to be nonalexithymic (n = 241) (Bagby et al.,
1994). In the following discussion, we will provide results only
from the dimensional perspective. For the same analysis with
categorical construct, see Supplementary Text S2.
There was strong effect of gender for IRI scores; women scored
higher on fantasizing, empathic concern, and personal distress
(rs > 0.180, HL estimators = 2.000 [1.000, 3.000]). But both
genders reported of being equally capable of perspective taking
(p > 0.3).
As expected, the acceptability judgment for impersonal moral
dilemma was higher than for personal moral dilemma (Wilcoxon
Signed Ranks test: Z = 12.793, p < 0.001, r = 0.703, HL estima-
tor= 2.000 [2.000, 2.500]). Thus, people found itmore acceptable
to endorse utilitarian option in impersonal than personal moral
Table 1 | Means with 95% confidence interval values, medians, minimum-maximum spread, gender differences, and Cronbach alphas for
alexithymia, empathy scores, and moral dilemma judgments.
Items Cronbach alpha Mean [95% CI] Median Min, Max Gender effects (Z )
DDF 0.665 12.51 [12.06, 12.95] 12 5, 24 −0.824
DIF 0.778 16.73 [16.15, 17.31] 16 7, 32 2.267*
EOT 0.629 15.34 [14.86, 15.86] 15 8, 28 −1.760
TAS-20 0.818 44.58 [43.42, 45.71] 44 20, 71 0.399
F 0.794 17.67 [17.21, 18.11] 18 5, 28 3.725***
PT 0.835 18.05 [17.57, 18.53] 18 3, 28 1.070
EC 0.781 18.69 [18.26, 19.10] 19 7, 28 4.295***
PD 0.802 11.35 [10.85, 11.87] 11 0, 26 4.175***
IRI-total 0.841 65.77 [64.71, 66.88] 66 31, 95 5.509***
Impersonal – 4.56 [4.34, 4.79] 5 1, 7 −2.692**
Personal – 2.51 [2.31, 2.74] 2 1, 7 −1.432
SD, standard deviation; DDF, difficulty describing feelings; DIF, difficulty identifying feelings; EOT, externally-oriented thinking; TAS, Toronto Alexithymia Scale; F,
fantasy; PT, perspective taking; PD, personal distress; EC, empathic concern; IRI, Interpersonal Reactivity Index. -, not applicable. Z, standardized statistic from
Mann-Whitney U test. Positive value of Z signifies that women scored higher on this variable than men. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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dilemma. Additionally, women gave lower appropriateness rating
than men for impersonal moral dilemma (r = −0.148, HL esti-
mator = 1.000 [0.000, 1.000]). As expected, there was more
variation for moral judgments about personal (coefficient of
variation = 73.4%) as compared to impersonal (coefficient of
variation = 41.2%) moral dilemma nonparametric Levene’s test:
F(1,660) = 127.8, p < 0.001.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS (TABLES 2, 3)
Ordinal regression with TAS as the predictor variable (see
Table 2) showed that increase in trait alexithymia was associated
with higher likelihood of reporting higher personal distress with
odds ratio of 1.051 (95% CI [1.032, 1.069]). Higher scores on
trait alexithymia also predicted an increase in odds of report-
ing lower perspective taking, with an odds ratio of 0.982 (95%
CI [0.964, 1.002]), and empathic concern, with an odds ratio
of 0.979 (95% CI [0.962, 0.996]). Also, a unit increase in trait
alexithymia increased odds of higher appropriateness rating for
personal moral dilemma (see Supplementary Figure S2) with an
odds ratio of 1.025 (95% CI [1.006, 1.048]), but there was only
marginally significant association between alexithymia and rat-
ings for impersonal moral dilemma (odds ratio= 1.0171 [0.9960,
1.0356], p = 0.058).
Ordinal regressions with subscales of IRI (see Table 3) showed
that only scores on empathic concern showed any associa-
tion with ratings on moral dilemmas. Increase in self-reported
empathic concern for others was associated with increase in odds
of finding utilitarian option on personal moral dilemma to be less
appropriate with an odds ratio of 0.935 (95% CI [0.885, 0.983])
for personal moral dilemma. There wasn’t any significant associ-
ation between empathic concern and impersonal moral dilemma
(p = 0.341).
All of the above-mentioned results held even after control-
ling for effects of age and gender by including them in predictor
variables (see Supplementary Tables S3–4). Correlation analysis
Table 2 | Alexithymia (TAS) scores predicting judgments on moral
dilemmas and empathy IRI subscales.
Predictor Criterion Logit coefficient Wald’s p-value
variable variable [95% CI]* chi-square
TAS-20 F 0.013 [−0.004, 0.036] 2.125 0.145
PT −0.018 [−0.037, 0.002] 4.063 0.044
EC −0.021 [−0.039,−0.004] 5.675 0.017
PD 0.050 [0.032, 0.067] 29.890 <0.001
Impersonal 0.017 [−0.004, 0.035] 3.602 0.058
Personal 0.025 [0.006, 0.047] 7.434 0.006
TAS, Toronto Alexithymia Scale; F, fantasy; PT, perspective taking; PD, personal
distress; EC, empathic concern; CI, confidence interval. See Supplementary
Table S3 for the same analysis with age and gender as additional predictor
variables.
*95% bias corrected and accelerated confidence intervals for logit coefficients
were generated using 10,000 bootstrap samples. Positive or negative value of
logit coefficient denote that increase in value of predictor variable is associated
with increased odds for higher or lower value of criterion variable, respectively.
further upheld the results from regression analysis and painted
the same picture further corroborating our two predictions (see
Supplementary Tables S1,2).
MEDIATION ANALYSIS (FIGURE 1)
Mediation analyses were used to ascertain the degree to which
increased utilitarian tendency in trait alexithymia on personal
moral dilemma was mediated through indirect effects stem-
ming from decreased levels of empathic concern in this trait.
Bootstrap estimation of 95% bias-corrected and accelerated con-
fidence intervals for the indirect effect was done implementing
Preacher-Hayes’ SPSS macro and using 20,000 bootstrap samples
(Preacher and Hayes, 2008a). This analysis showed that empathic
concern indeed mediated (95% CI [0.0001, 0.0075]) the relation
between trait alexithymia and higher endorsement of utilitarian
solution for personal moral dilemma (see Figure 1). Index of
mediation (Preacher and Hayes, 2008b) for empathic concern,
which is a standardized effect size measure of mediation, was
0.0148 (95% CI [0.0006, 0.0448]). Similar results emerged even
after running the same mediation analysis controlling for age and
gender (see Supplementary Figure S1). Thus, trait alexithymia
influenced moral judgments via empathic concern such that it
led to reduction in empathic concern which reduced the affec-
tive aversion to the prospect of personally harming someone for
the greater good. Our third prediction was therefore also borne
out by the data.
DISCUSSION
Recent dual process models of moral judgments posit automatic
emotional intuitions that support deontological decisions which
compete with response from deliberative reasoning systems that
support utilitarian decisions on personal moral dilemmas. One
Table 3 | IRI subscale scores predicting judgments on moral
dilemmas.
Predictor Criterion Logit coefficient Wald’s p-value
variable variable [95% CI]* chi-square
F Impersonal −0.009 [−0.050, 0.034] 0.190 0.663
Personal 0.020 [−0.028, 0.068] 0.744 0.388
PT Impersonal 0.002 [−0.045, 0.045] 0.009 0.925
Personal 0.012 [−0.028, 0.055] 0.283 0.595
EC Impersonal −0.023 [−0.076, 0.027] 0.907 0.341
Personal −0.067 [−0.122,−0.017] 6.737 0.009
PD Impersonal 0.000 [−0.043, 0.042] <0.000 1.000
Personal 0.010 [−0.036, 0.057] 0.228 0.633
F, fantasy; PT, perspective taking; PD, personal distress; EC, empathic concern;
CI, confidence interval. See Supplementary Table S4 for the same analysis with
age and gender as additional predictor variables.
*95% bias corrected and accelerated confidence intervals for logit coefficients
were generated using 10,000 bootstrap samples. Positive or negative value of
logit coefficient denote that increase in value of predictor variable is associated
with increased odds for higher or lower value of criterion variable, respectively.
Frontiers in Psychology | Emotion Science May 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 501 | 6
Patil and Silani Alexithymia and utilitarian moral judgments
FIGURE 1 | Mediation analysis results. Negative logit coefficient from
ordinal regression denotes reduced empathic concern and increased
acceptability of utilitarian option on personal moral dilemma. Bias-corrected
and accelerated 95% CIs from 20,000 bootstrap samples are reported for
specific indirect effects. The increased utilitarian tendency on personal
dilemma in trait alexithymia was due to reduced empathic concern.
Continuous lines denote significant mediation path, while dashed lines
denote nonsignificant mediation path.
source of negative affect that drives intuitive processes is outcome
aversion arising from empathic response to the prospective dis-
tress that victim would be put through. There is overwhelming
evidence to support the claim that reduction in this empathetic
response can erode the negative affect making way for utili-
tarian judgments to come through and dominate the decision-
making procedure (see Section Two Paths to Utilitarian Moral
Judgments). Current results add to this rich body of literature
another instance where empathic deficits lead to utilitarian moral
judgments in alexithymic personalities.
ALEXITHYMIA AND EMPATHY
Empathy entails the ability to know what others feel and to vicar-
iously experience what others feel while keeping in mind that the
target of this process is different from the self. Self-awareness is
crucial to these abilities because one has to recognize one’s own
emotions to identify with those emotions in others (Hooker et al.,
2008) or, to borrow words from Jonason and Krause (2013), one
has to know where one’s own shoes are before putting oneself in
someone else’s shoes. Thus, given problems associated with alex-
ithymia in recognizing, identifying, labeling emotions (Nemiah
et al., 1976) and their reduced ability to reflect on their internal
states (Silani et al., 2008), it is unsurprising that they tend to have
reduced empathic skills which have been extensively reported in
the literature.
In the current study, we replicated results from previous
studies (Guttman and Laporte, 2002; Moriguchi et al., 2007;
Grynberg et al., 2010; Jonason and Krause, 2013) showing that
trait alexithymia in general population is associated with (a)
reduced empathic concern, (b) reduced perspective taking, (c)
increased personal distress, but (d) shows no impairment on fan-
tasy subscale of IRI. After ensuring that trait alexithymia indeed
showed negative correlation with empathy, we explored how the-
ses empathic deficits impacted decision-making in interpersonal
domain by studying their moral judgments on moral dilemmas.
EMPATHY AND MORAL JUDGMENTS
Since trait alexithymia is associated with reduced empathic skills,
it provides a good testing ground to explore the exact link between
empathy and morality. Although it has been argued that empa-
thy is not necessary for moral judgments (Prinz, 2011) where
there is no clearly discernible victim, e.g., insider trading, its epis-
temic and motivational role in harm-based moral judgments is
undeniable (Pizarro, 2000; Ugazio et al., in press). Empathy has
been argued to have led to evolution of harm/care-based morality
(Decety, 2014) and is said to be essential for proper moral devel-
opment (Hoffman, 2001), especially for developmentally learning
the socio-moral norms about harm/care as opposed to other con-
ventional norms (Blair, 1995). Empathy enables people to share
the affective state of victims of others’ moral actions. If this is
an action that leads to distress in the victim, then empathic res-
onance with the victim’s suffering leads to empathic arousal in
the observer and informs her that morally relevant event is taking
place (epistemic role) and motivates observer to either approach
the victim to alleviate her suffering or to withdraw from the situa-
tion to remove the source of personal distress (motivational role).
Thus, empathy is implicated as a moral emotion because it is a
moral marker by which people understand that moral norms are
being violated and are motivated to deem those actions morally
wrong which cause suffering in the victim. This explains how
people judge hypothetical situations where they are implicated as
agents.
When people have to morally judge certain hypotheti-
cal action, they engage in evaluative simulation (Miller and
Cushman, 2013) by putting themselves at the receiving end of
the action (cognitive empathy) and experiencing what the patient
would experience (affective empathy), which provides them with
direct feedback about the consequences that such action would
entail and people use this feedback of approbation or disapproba-
tion as the motivational basis of their moral judgments (Ugazio
et al., in press). For example, in case of footbridge dilemma,
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when participants simulate pushing the proximate large person to
his/her death, they instantly experience an intense pang of nega-
tive emotion in response to suffering of the victim which prompts
them to say no. Reduction in this empathy-based affective aver-
sion to bad outcomes leads to more utilitarian moral judgments,
while intensification of this aversion leads to more deontologi-
cal moral judgments on personal moral dilemmas (see Section
Two Paths to UtilitarianMoral Judgments). On the other hand, in
impersonal moral dilemmas, the action of flipping switch, which
changes the direction of toxic fumes and ultimately kills one per-
son, is not as psychologically near (Liberman et al., 2007) and as
personal (Greene et al., 2009) as pushing salient victim with one’s
own muscular force and, thus, does not elicit robust empathic
response.
In this framework, it is easy to see how reduced empathic con-
cern in trait alexithymia leads to deeming personally killing one
to save many as more appropriate. When participants with higher
score on trait alexithymia are presented with the option of push-
ing a stranger in footbridge dilemma, the reduced other-oriented
feelings of compassion and warmth in response to the experience
of this salient victim (as indexed by empathic concern) pre-empts
the source of negative affect originating in affective aversion to
distress in the victim (outcome aversion). Without this prepotent
and robust affective reaction, the deliberative reasoning processes
lead the charge and support the utilitarian solution. On the
other hand, victim in the impersonal moral dilemma needs to be
harmed in a psychologically distant way and hence the suffering
and distress in this victim is construed at an abstract level as com-
pared construal of victim suffering in the personal moral dilemma
at a very concrete level (Eyal and Liberman, 2012). Since there is
not strong empathic resonance with the psychologically distant
victim (Liberman et al., 2007) and impersonal way of implement-
ing harm is emotionally less salient (Greene et al., 2009), role of
empathy-based outcome aversion is downplayed on impersonal
moral dilemmas and reduced empathic concern in trait alex-
ithymia does not lead to higher tendency to endorse utilitarian
solution.
These results comport well with previous finding from study
by Gleichgerrcht and Young (2013) that showed that intransi-
gent utilitarians, i.e., people who endorsed utilitarian solution
for both impersonal and personal dilemmas, scored low only on
empathic concern and no other subscale of IRI than flexible util-
itarians (who consented to utilitarian solution on impersonal but
not personal dilemma) and nonutilitarians (who refused to accept
utilitarian solution on any dilemma).
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS AND FUTURE SCOPE
Although we have argued here that reduced empathic concern
leads to increased utilitarian judgments in trait alexithymia, we
haven’t ruled out the possibility that there might be some addi-
tional features of trait alexithymia that predisposes it toward
a utilitarian moral profile. One can argue that in addition to
reduced empathic concern, alexithymic personalities may also
have higher preference for need for cognition and reflective think-
ing and this contributes to the utilitarian moral judgments (see
Section Two Paths to Utilitarian Moral Judgments). Although
we can’t completely rule out this possibility, it seems unlikely
given the evidence that trait alexithymia actually shows negative
correlation with need for cognition (Bagby et al., 1986), which
would predict reduced and not enhanced utilitarian tendencies in
alexithymia.
Another plausible explanation is provided by Koven (2011)
who showed that the construct clarity of emotion (i.e., how clearly
one understands and can discriminate among one’s emotions),
was negatively correlated with utilitarian outcomes, while the
construct attention to emotion (i.e., the degree to which one
monitors and thinks about one’s emotions) did not show any
relation to utilitarian inclinations. She argues, based on research
by Gohm (2003), that people who suffer from chronic confu-
sion about their intense emotional experiences generally develop
a trait-like pattern of down-regulating negative affect proficiently.
Thus, in Koven’s study, people with less clarity of emotion might
have utilized negative affect elicited by personal moral dilemmas
to lesser extent by down-regulating it and endorsed utilitarian
judgments. Given that trait alexithymia is associated with con-
fusion over one’s emotional experience, it can be argued that
they develop emotion regulation strategy of suppressing emo-
tions which indeed seems to be the case (e.g., Swart et al., 2009).
In other words, alexithymic people modulate their responses
by expressive repression strategy in which emotion-expressive
behavior is inhibited. Add to this the role of emotion regula-
tion in moral judgments (Szekelya and Miu, 2014; Helion and
Pizarro, in press) and it can be extrapolated that trait alexithymia
harbors utilitarian proclivities due to additive effect of blunt neg-
ative affect owing to reduced empathic concern for the victim
and suppression of this remaining affect due to superior cogni-
tive control of emotion. Future brain imaging studies should be
able to arbitrate on the validity of this line of reasoning.
LIMITATIONS
One conspicuous shortcoming of this study is that sample con-
sisted mostly of the young college-students, which limits the
generalizability of these findings. It would be interesting to see if
the same results can be replicated with clinical patients, e.g., peo-
ple with psychosomatic complains, who present with high level of
alexithymia.
Another shortcoming of the study is that we did not collect
response time data and could not rule out participants who com-
pleted task insincerely based on this data. That said, we contend
that it is unlikely that participants gave random responses to the
questions because participants voluntarily logged onto the web-
page to complete the survey and did not have any motivation
apart from the wish to participate in the experiment.
Another drawback of the study is the limited number of moral
dilemmas used, although this is not an unusual practice (e.g.,
Mendez et al., 2005; Gleichgerrcht et al., 2011, 2013; McIlwain
et al., 2012; Trémolière et al., 2012; Gleichgerrcht and Young,
2013; Jack et al., 2014; Trémolière and Bonnefon, 2014).
Additional statistical worry is that the main results might be
false positives. The sensitivity analysis (see Section Data analy-
sis) showed that our study could detect correlation coefficient
greater than 0.153 and yet we detected significant correlations
(see Supplementary Tables S2,3) of -0.125 (TAS and empathic
concern), 0.140 (TAS and ratings on personal moral dilemma),
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and −0.119 (empathic concern and ratings on personal moral
dilemma). Although we can’t completely rule out this possibility,
we establish the stability of our results by computing confi-
dence intervals for estimators of interest (correlation coefficients,
regression coefficients, etc.) using bootstrapping methods with
as many as 10,000 samples (minimum recommended: 1000; IBM
SPSS Bootstrapping 20.0 manual, 2011). Bootstrapping methods
are valuable when the sample sizes are small and are not repre-
sentative of the entire population because they are asymptotically
more accurate than the standard intervals computed based on
sample variance and normality assumptions (Adèr et al., 2008).
To sum it up, although we did not have sufficient sample size to
detect significant associations that we did detect, we prop these
results up with more reliable statistical techniques.
IMPLICATIONS
Alexithymia has been shown to be comorbid with autism, with
as many as 50% of autistic population exhibiting clinical scores
on alexithymia measures (Hill et al., 2004). Additionally, autistic
population has been shown to be more utilitarian than con-
trol population on personal moral dilemma (Gleichgerrcht et al.,
2013), which was argued to be due to reduced cognitive empa-
thy in autism. But, based on the current findings, alternative
explanation for these results can be that autism is associated
with utilitarian bias due reduced affective empathy owing to
co-occurring alexithymia and will not be associated with any
increased utilitarian tendency if individual alexithymia scores are
entered as a covariate in the analysis (cf. Bird et al., 2010). Future
studies should explore this possibility.
CONCLUSION
This research provided additional evidence for a link between trait
alexithymia and empathy deficits and explored how this disrup-
tion translated into behavior in hypothetical moral situations.
Our findings suggest that this impairment in empathic skills,
especially empathic concern, contributes to reduction in harm
aversion which leads to increased propensity in alexithymic pop-
ulation toward agreeing to personally harming someone for the
greater good on moral dilemmas. Results also provide additional
evidence for the validity of Greene’s dual process model for moral
decision-making.
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